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Abstract
Al-Ghazālī’s engagement with skepticism in the Deliverance from Er-
ror has received much attention in recent literature, often in the con-
text of comparing him with Descartes. However, there is one curious
text that has gone largely unnoticed by commentators. In his account
of how he overcame skepticism vis-à-vis a divine light cast unto his
heart, al-Ghazālī makes a cryptic claim that suggests that primary
truths are inherent to the mind, and that said cognitive status of
primary truths is related to his overcoming of skepticism. Although
this one text does not straightforwardly prove that al-Ghazālī is a
nativist, I argue that there are other texts that plausibly reveal his
nativism. As such, I argue that al-Ghazālī can be read as a nativist,
and I reconstruct a way in which said nativism helps explain how
he overcomes skepticism. In doing so, I defend the (standard) strong
divine interventionist reading of al-Ghazālī’s response to skepticism,
against Hadisi’s recent weak strong interventionist reading.
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‘There was what was of what I do not mention:
So think well of it, and ask for no account’.
- Ibn al-Mu‘tazz
1 Introduction
Al-Ghazālī’s skeptical crisis in the Deliverance from Error [al-Munqidh min
al-Dalāl] has received increasing attention by historians of philosophy in re-
cent years.1 2 The story, in broad strokes, is clear enough. Al-Ghazālī seeks
1I employ the following abbreviations for editions of primary texts: ‘DE’: Deliverance
from Error (cited by page); ‘MD’: al-Munqidh min al-Dalāl [Ayyad and Saliba Edition—I
have also consulted McCarthy’s notes and transliterations of the Arabic when necessary]
(cited by page).; ‘MF’: al-Maqāsīd al-Falāsifa (cited by page); ‘NL’: Niche of Lights (cited
by page); ‘RRS’: Revival of the Religious Sciences (cited by book and page).
2See, for example, Albertini 2005; Götz 2003; Griffel 2011; Hadisi 2021; Kukkonen
2010; Menn 2003; Moad 2009; Ruddle-Miyamoto 2017; and Zamir 2010. For studies of the
relationship between al-Ghazālī and Descartes, see Götz 2003; Lewes 1970; Naumkin 1987;
Sharif 1963; Van Ess 2018.
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to attain true and absolutely certain knowledge, and for the sake of that
pursuit he raises skeptical arguments—about the reliability of the senses
and the intellect—which ultimately undermine the possibility of both sen-
sory and rationally based knowledge. Al-Ghazālī realizes that the only way
to respond to skepticism is with a rational proof. But given his skepticism
about the intellect—i.e. that so-called “primary truths” might be false and
that the intellect more generally is unreliable—proofs cannot be constructed.
Thus, al-Ghazālī sees no way out, and becomes a skeptic. After two months,
however, he claims that God intervened and rescued him from his skeptical
condition through a divine light cast unto his heart, which restored his trust
in the primary truths of the intellect.3
Many of the details of al-Ghazalī’s bout with skepticism have been dis-
cussed in the literature. However, there is one peculiar feature of al-Ghazālī’s
solution to skepticism which—in my estimation—has been wholly neglected
by commentators. The issue concerns a detail about the divine light that is
cast unto al-Ghazālī’s heart, and its relation to the foundations of knowledge
that al-Ghazālī secures. Al-Ghazālī seems to claim, in a brief paragraph, that
this divine light is the true source of certain knowledge, because it illuminates
foundational primary truths that are already present in the mind. This is a
striking claim, for prima facie it sounds like al-Ghazālī is espousing a form
of nativism. And as is well-known, nativism has been a key instrument for
some philosophers to counter skepticism.4
In broad strokes, nativism is the theory that there are certain types of
content or truths that are native or innate to the mind.5 Nativism is often
3Commentators often claim that al-Ghazālī’s resolution of skepticism restores trust in
both the senses and the intellect. However, as we will see, he never makes this claim. He
only claims that the divine light helped restore primary truths.
4Famously, Descartes’ innate ideas—and his clear and distinct perceptions of them—
are central to his defeat of skepticism. For an account of Descartes’ nativism, see Nelson
(2008).
5For an excellent overview of nativism see Samet (2019). In what follows, I will work
with a non-controversial sufficient condition for nativism (see section 3), bracketing the
controversial details for the purposes of this paper.
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contrasted with empiricism, which claims that the mind in its original form
is a tabula rasa, and that all content is ultimately derived through sensory
experience. On nativism, these innate truths are not acquired empirically,
rather they are—in some way or another—discovered as existing in the mind
and accessed solely through a non-sensory faculty (say, the intellect).6 While
nativism can be traced back to Plato’s doctrine of anamnesis in the Meno,
the heyday of nativism is the early modern period, where philosophers such
as Descartes, Malebranche, Locke, and Leibniz wrote extensively about in-
nate ideas (some for, some against), laying out the contours of the theory.
Of course, one needs to be careful to not force ancient Greek or early mod-
ern concepts onto the Islamic period. However, the status of innate ideas in
Islamic philosophy has been raised in the literature. For example, commenta-
tors claim that Avicenna denied that primary truths—indeed, the very ones
that al-Ghazālī is interested in—are innate. For example:
It needs to be emphasized that Avicenna denies innate ideas. His
theory of the rational soul, well studied by now, is unambiguous.
Upon birth, the newly created intellect that is associated with the
body is absolutely potential, a tabula rasa. (Gutas 2012: 404)7
Moreover, at least one commentator has implicitly claimed that al-Ghazālī
espouses a form of nativism (Kukkonen 2012), while another has denied it
(Treiger 2012). Thus exploring whether al-Ghazālī ascribes to a stripe of
6While I will assume that on al-Ghazālī’s view it is through the intellect that primary
truths are accessed, this is a complicated claim given al-Ghazālī’s views of the cognitive
archictecture of the heart, and the various faculties within it.
7Like al-Ghazālī, Avicenna’s standard examples of primary truths include: “The whole
is greater than the part”; “All things that are equal to one thing, are equal to each other”;
“There is no middle between the negative and the affirmative,” etc. For a detailed account
of how Avicenna views primary truths as being ultimately absracted from experience see
Gutas (2012). Black (2013: 126) also denies that Avicenna ascribes to innate ideas. For a
more recent treatment of Avicenna on primary truths or propositions see Mousavian and
Ardeshir (2018).
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nativism is motivated, and could prove fruitful. 8 In this paper, I argue that
al-Ghazālī can be read as a nativist, and that doing so has interpretive benefits
with respect to understanding his response to skepticism.
Before proceeding, three clarifications are in order. The first clarification
is methodological: I do not pretend that there is knock-down textual evi-
dence for this claim. Indeed, al-Ghazālī has grounds for concealing how he
overcame skepticism. As our epigraph suggests, al-Ghazālī has philosophi-
cal and theological reasons for maintaining that encounters with the divine
simply cannot be described discursively. As he writes in the Deliverance: “if
anyone tries to express them, his words contain evident error against which
he cannot guard himself” (DE: 82). One might think that this concession
implies that the aim at hand is a non-starter. However, I do not think that
the texts are underdetermined. He leaves us with hints, clues, and indications
which are well worth fleshing out.
Second, in offering this reading, I will defend the standard reading of
al-Ghazālī’s response to skepticism that has recently come under attack by
Hadisi (2021). On the standard view, it is through a divine intervention that
al-Ghazālī is rescued from skepticism. Hadisi and other commentators regard
this as a form of fideism, however, I find that this term is misleading with
respect to al-Ghazālī’s considered views (Wilson 1996: 1820; Khalidi 2005:
xxvi).9 Instead, I will call this divine interventionism, distinguishing between
8I am not interested in whether the original nature of the human being (al-fiṭrah)
inherently has a conception of God. Indeed, there are texts where al-Ghazālī seems to
endorse this canonical position, for example:
Therefore the prophets were sent to call humanity to [God’s unity], that
they might say, “There is no god but God.” They were not commanded to
say, “We have a God and the world has a God,” because this was naturally
inherent in their minds from the time of their childhood and the prime of
[their] youth. (RRS II: 60)
I am only interested in the cognitive status of primary truths.
9I do not think that al-Ghazālī’s divine intervention commits him to the claim that
knowledge depends on faith or revelation. His view of the divine light is more philosophical
and subtle than that. This may be a verbal dispute, but I nonetheless want to avoid the
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strong divine interventionism and weak divine interventionism. The standard
view is strong divine interventionism. On this reading, al-Ghazālī is wholly
passive with respect to his skeptical state, and requires God to intervene via
a divine light and rescue him from skepticism. Hadisi defends weak divine
interventionism. On this view, while God does have a role in rescuing al-
Ghazālī, al-Ghazālī cannot be passive but must be active: he must engage
in a variety of Sufi transformative practices that cultivate his imaginative
capacities, making him receptive to an experience of the divine light. To be
clear, while I think that Hadisi’s weak divine interventionism reading might
be more philosophically attractive, I claim that it is not textually defensible.
Alas, al-Ghazālī might be “hopelessly fideist”, as Hadisi claims (2021: 1).
Third, Hadisi (2021: 1-2) is right to complain that commentators have
over-emphasized and over-simplified the similarities between al-Ghazālī and
Descartes, and this can obfuscate the details of al-Ghazālī’s considered views.
The result of this paper, however, may convince some that al-Ghazālī and
Descartes are even more similar than commentators have allowed. For if I
am right, then not only are Descartes and al-Ghazālī’s skeptical arguments
similar, but they also both use nativism to (in part) counter skepticism.
However, I aim to read al-Ghazālī on his own terms. This is not a comparative
study, and so the interpretive results will be what they are. It is out of the
scope of this project to determine whether al-Ghazālī and Descartes really
are similar on this score as well.
2 Nativism in the Deliverance from Error?
In the Deliverance, al-Ghazālī raises two skeptical arguments that generate
skepticism. These skeptical arguments have received considerable attention
in the literature, thus I will offer a brief review of these arguments. My target
is al-Ghazālī’s cognitive position with respect to the skepticism he generated,
terminology of ‘fideism’.
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focusing on the divine light that rescues him from skepticism, and of course,
the prima facie nativist passage that seems to be a key piece to figuring out
how this divine intervention actually works.
To start, we need to set forth al-Ghazālī’s definition of knowledge in the
Deliverance:
Sure and certain knowledge [al-‘ilm al-yaqīnī ] is that in which the
thing known is made so manifest that no doubt [rayb] clings to it,
nor is it accompanied by the possibility of error and deception.
(DE: 55)
As Hadisi (2021:3) and other commentators have noted, al-Ghazāli is an in-
ternalist. More specifically, al-Ghazālī’s conception of knowledge is as follows:
GHAZALIAN KNOWLEDGE: A subject, S, knows that p iff :
1 S believes that p.
2 p is true.
3 S has absolute certainty that p.10
The key feature of Ghazalian Knowledge is absolute certainty. Accord-
ing to al-Ghazālī, “with regard to the proponents of speculation and the
theologians, they use it [certainty] to express an absence of doubt” (RRS I:
216). As Hadisi (2021: 5) has interestingly clarified, the criterion of absolute
certainty can be unpacked into the following three conditions:
actual-certainty S has no doubt about p.11
modal-certainty S cannot doubt p.
10Plausibly, there might be an infallibility criterion as well, that al-Ghazālī is conflating
with the absolute certainty criterion. That is, al-Ghazālī might also be claiming that
knowledge must be infallible, in the sense that there it is not possible for the subject to
be in error. I will bracket this issue, and focus on the absolute certainty criterion instead.
11What Hadisi calls ‘actual-certainty’ could be aptly described as a form of psychological
certainty, and thus it is not epistemically relevant.
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proof-certainty S can establish the impossibility of doubting p.
I myself do not see the reason to ascribe proof-certainty to al-Ghazālī, and
thus I will only reference actual-certainty and modal-certainty in explaining
the skeptical arguments.
With this definition in mind, we can now turn to his two skeptical argu-
ments. First, in the sensory perception doubt he argues that the senses are
dubitable because they provide the mind with misrepresentational content,
and thus cannot serve as the grounds for true and certain knowledge about
properties of the external world:
The strongest of the senses is the sense of sight. Now this looks
at a shadow and sees it standing still and motionless and judges
that motion must be denied. Then, due to experience and ob-
servation an hour later it knows that the shadow is moving, and
that did not move in a sudden spurt, but so gradually and imper-
ceptibly that it was never completely at rest...In the case of this
and of similar instances of sense-data the sense-judge makes its
judgments, but the reason-judge refutes it and repeatedly gives
it the lie in an incontrovertible fashion. (DE: 56; cf. NL: 6)
Here is the argument reconstructed:
1. If the senses provide S with misrepresentational content about the ex-
ternal world, then sense-data cannot provide content to S that satisfies
modal-certainty.
2. The intellect can detect sensory discreprancies, and reveal that the
senses do misrepresent what external objects are like to S.
∴ Sense-data cannot provide content to S that satisfies modal-certainty.
∴ Sense-data cannot be a source of knowledge for S about the external
world.
∴ For S, the senses are unreliable.
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Having lost sense-data, al-Ghazālī claims that “Perhaps, therefore, I can rely
only on those rational data which belong to the category of primary truths”
(DE: 56). However, in the dream doubt he argues that necessary truths or
“primary truths” are also dubitable. Primary truths are self-evident or basic
(awwalī ): they are supposed to be foundational to proofs, and the acquisition
of knowledge more generally. Here are al-Ghazali’s examples:
1. One and the same thing cannot be simultaneously affirmed and denied
2. One and the same thing cannot be incipient and eternal, existent and
non-existent, necessary and impossible.
Al-Ghazali argues that we may be in a dream state with respect to primary
truths. That is, our current waking state might be like a dream with respect
to a higher-cognitive state that we could enter. If such a higher-cognitive
state is possible, then we could raise an intelligible doubt against primary
truths:
Don’t you see that when you are asleep you believe certain things
and imagine certain circumstances and believe they are fixed and
lasting and entertain no doubts about that being their status?
Then you wake up and know that all your imaginings and beliefs
were groundless and insubstantial. So while everything you be-
lieve through sensation or intellection in your waking state may
be true in relation to that state, what assurance have you that you
may not suddenly experience a state which would have the same
relation to your waking state as the latter has to your dreaming,
and your waking state would be dreaming in relation to that new
and further state? If you found yourself in such a state, you would
be sure that all your rational beliefs were unsubstantial fancies.
(DE: 57)
Here is the argument reconstructed:
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1. In S’s current cognitive position, C1, S does not doubt primary truths
(i.e. actual certainty is satisfied).
2. However, if it is possible that C1 is akin to a dream state for S where
what S perceives is false, then S’s belief in primary truths cannot
amount to knowledge (i.e. S cannot satisfy modal certainty).
3. It is possible that C1 is a dream state for S, that is, it is possible for
S to transition from C1 into a new cognitive position, C2, and realize
that the beliefs held in C1 were false
∴ S does not have knowledge of primary truths in C1 (i.e. S cannot satisfy
modal-certainty)
∴ For S, in C1, the intellect is unreliable.
Having generated skepticism, al-Ghazālī finds himself backed into a corner:
My effort was unsuccessful, since the objections could be refuted
only by proof [dalīl]. But the only way to put together a proof
was to combine primary cognitions. So if, in my case, these were
inadmissible, it was impossible to construct the proof. (DE: 57)
Reconstructed, here is the skeptical challenge:
1. The only way for S to counter skepticism is through a proof.
2. A proof requires appeal to primary truths.
3. Primary truths are undermined by the dream doubt.
1. S cannot construct a proof to counter skepticism.
∴ S has no way to defeat skepticism.
Internalizing the skepticism, al-Ghazālī sees no way out, claiming that “this
malady was mysterious and it lasted for nearly two months. During that
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time I was a skeptic in fact, but not in utterance and doctrine” (DE: 57).12
Al-Ghazālī, of course, does not remain a skeptic. So how does he defeat
skepticism? This, actually, is not the right question. For although al-Ghazālī
overcomes these skeptical arguments, there is only a thin sense in which he
defeats skepticism:
At length God Most High cured me of that sickness. My soul
regained its health and equilibrium and once again I accepted
the self-evident data of reason and relied on them with safety
and certainty [yaqīn]. But that was not achieved by constructing
a proof [dalīl] or putting together an argument [tartīb kalām].
On the contrary, it was the effect of a light [nūr] which God
Most High cast into my breast [al-ṣadr]. And that light is the
key [miftaḥ] to most knowledge [al-ma‘ārif ]. Therefore, whoever
thinks that the unveiling of truth [al-kashf ] depends on precisely
formulated proofs has indeed straitened the broad mercy of God.
(DE: 57)
First, al-Ghazālī claims that God rescued him from his skeptical condition
by “the effect of a light which God most high cast into my breast. And that
light is the key to most knowledge.” In other words, al-Ghazālī claims that
the only way out of skepticism is through the experience of a divine light,
which is a type of divine intervention. With the experience of this divine
light, al-Ghazālī is able to reject premises (1) and (3) of the above argument.
Although one cannot defeat skepticism through a proof, one can (somehow)
overcome skepticism and recover the intellect and its primary truths through
the assistance of God. Second, notice that al-Ghazali claims that the divine
12The last clause of this statement is important, because it reveals that (unlike
Descartes), al-Ghazālī does not regard himself as generating hyperbolic doubt or global
skepticism. In claiming that he was not a skeptic in utterance or doctrine, al-Ghazālī is
indicating to the reader that the existence of God was never under question. This is impor-
tant, because it will show that the experience of the divine light is not suppose to reveal
or prove that God exists to al-Ghazālī, rather its function lies elsewhere.
10
light only helped restore his trust in the intellect and its primary truths. He
does not make any claims about restoring trust in the senses. Indeed, this
is made clear in the following section of the Deliverance where al-Ghazali
evaluates kalam, claiming that:
Most of their polemic was devoted to bringing out the inconsis-
tencies of their adversaries and criticizing them for the logically
absurd consequences of what they conceded. This, however, is of
little use in the case of one who admits nothing at all except the
primary and self-evident truths. (DE: 59-60)
But what exactly is the nature of this divine light, and how does it help al-
Ghazālī overcome skepticism? Al-Ghazālī does not tell us much, and what he
does say seems confusing and underdeveloped. In the paragraph following his
initial discussion of the divine light, al-Ghazālī proceeds to quote a variety
of hadith and Qur’anic verses about the divine light, with some interspersed
comments. For example, al-Ghazālī says: “from that light, then, the unveiling
of truth must be sought” (DE: 58). But this is not helpful at all. Prima facie,
this is a fairly standard claim—made by many Islamic thinkers—that God is
the source of truth. The skeptical challenge concerns how to validate primary
truths so that we can be justified in making genuine epistemic claims, i.e.
satisfy Ghazalian Knowledge. Merely claiming that God is the source of
truth, while indicative, does not serve as a genuine philosophical explanation.
However, in the next paragraph, al-Ghazālī makes a striking claim that
offers a clue to his considered position. This is the prima facie nativist pas-
sage:
The aim of this account is to emphasize that one should be most
diligent in seeking the truth until he finally comes to seeking the
unseekable. For primary truths are unseekable, because they are
present in the mind; and when what is present is sought, it is lost
and hides itself. (DE: 58)
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What seems nativist about this passage is al-Ghazali’s claim that “primary
truths are unseekable, because they are present in the mind.” Given that al-
Ghazālī makes this claim after having generated and refuted skepticism, a
natural reading of this passage suggests that primary truths are present in
the mind in virtue of being innate to the mind. And that the divine light
has some role in this. Keeping this possible nativism in mind, as well as al-
Ghazali’s claim that God is the source of truth through a type of unveiling
or kashf, there are three possible (and non-mutually exclusive) readings of
how the divine light might interact with al-Ghazali’s possible nativism:
1. God is the creator of primary truths.
2. God implants primary truths into the mind.
3. It is through the divine light that a subject can recognize the truth and
certainty of primary truths.
Depending on which reading(s) we go for, there may be a sensible way of
reconstructing al-Ghazali’s response to skepticism. But this text alone cannot
settle the matter; we must look elsewhere to find evidence for al-Ghazali’s
nativism.
3 Al-Ghazālī’s Nativism
There are different varieties of nativism throughout the history of philosophy,
but the main contention of nativism is clear. Against empiricists, nativists
claim that the mind inherently contains certain types of information or con-
tent in the form of ideas, concepts, principles, etc. In other words, the mind is
not a tabula rasa that acquires all of its content through some sort of sensory
experience. Let us propose, then, the following sufficient condition nativism:
NATIVISM: A theory of the mind, T, counts as nativist if :
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1. T admits that some type of content, C, is innate to the mind (i.e. not
acquired empirically).13
Related to the issue of nativism is the epistemic status of primary truths,
namely, that they are known a priori. Al-Ghazālī is clear that primary truths
are a priori in claiming that they are self-evident (see, e.g., RRS II: 60; MF:
12). It is important to make the conceptual distinction between a content C
being known a priori (i.e. independent of sensory experience), and whether
C is innate to the mind. We are interested in the latter question.
Al-Ghazālī distinguishes between two kinds of knowledge that can be
present in the heart (or mind): intellectual knowledge and knowledge of divine
law.14 We will set knowledge of divine law aside, focusing on intellectual
13It is important to note that this sufficient condition does not make any claims about
the mind, heart, or soul having this innate content from its inception. Nativism is defined
negatively: the content is in no way derived from empirical sources (broadly construed).
14The spiritual heart or what we we would call the ‘mind’ constitutes the essence of a
person. It is where perception, experience, and knowledge obtains, and it is the aspect of
the person that is subject to moral responsibility. Expanding on the nature of the heart
and its epistemic capacities, al-Ghazālī writes:
Know that the seat of knowledge is the heart, by which I mean the subtle
tenuous substance that rules all the parts of the body and is obeyed and
served by all its members. In its relationship to the real nature of intelligibles,
it is like a mirror in its relationship to the forms of changing appearances.
For even as that which changes has a form, and the image of that form is
reflected in the mirror and represented therein, so also every intelligible has a
specific nature, and this specific nature has a form that is reflected and made
manifest in the mirror of the heart. Even as the mirror is one thing, the forms
of individuals another, and the representation of their image in the mirror
another, being thus three things in all, so here, too, there are three things:
the heart, the specific natures of things, and the representations and presence
of these in the heart. The ‘intellect’ is an expression for the heart in which
there exists the image of the specific nature of things. The ‘intelligible’ is an
expression for the specific nature of things. ’Intelligence’ is an expression for
the representation of the image in the mirror. (RRL XXI: 35).
In this passage, al-Ghazālī lays out what we might call the cognitive architecture of the
heart or mind. Al-Ghazālī likens the heart to a mirror, which provides reflections of things
which are effectively representational states. I will not take a stance on whether al-Ghazāl
is an indirect or a direct realist; however, if al-Ghazālī is a nativist, then he must be
committed to the claim that certain representations of intelligibles are innate to the heart.
13
knowledge. By ‘intellectual knowledge’ al-Ghazālī means “that by which the
innate intellect makes its judgments and which does not come into existence
through blind imitation and instruction” (RRS XXI: 45). According to al-
Ghazālī, “Intellectual knowledge (‘ulūm ‘aqliyya) is subdivided into axiomatic
(ḍarūriyya) and acquired (muktasaba).” Acquired knowledge is “divided into
that which deals with this [present] world, and with the world to come” and
it “is gained by learning and deduction.” Regarding the present world, the
objects of acquired knowledge are “such sciences as medicine, mathematics,
engineering, astronomy, and other professions and trades” (RRS XXI: 49).
Regarding the world to come, the objects of acquired knowledge are “the
states of the heart, of defects in religious works, and of the knowledge of
God, the Exalted, and His attributes and His acts” (RRS XXI: 49). Acquired
knowledge concerning the present world and the world to come is ultimately
obtained through instruction and deduction.
Given that acquired knowledge depends on both learning and deduction,
it is clear that it does not meet our sufficient condition for nativism. Acquired
knowledge is derived from experience. However, this is not so when we turn
to axiomatic knowledge. Al-Ghazālī writes:
No one knows whence or how the axiomatic is attained. Such is a
man’s knowledge [for example], that one person cannot be in two
places, and that one thing cannot both be created and eternal,
existence and nonexistent at the same time. For man finds this
knowledge to be a natural endowment of his soul from his youth,
and does not know when or whence he attained it. I mean that
he does not know any proximate cause for it. (RRS XXI: 45)
Al-Ghazālī, I contend, commits himself to some form of nativism in this pas-
sage. Al-Ghazālī claims that axiomatic knowledge is a natural endowment
of the soul. A plausible reading of this claim is that axiomatic knowledge
is innate knowledge. Given that axiomatic knowledge is contrasted with ac-
quired knowledge, this rules out the possibility that axiomatic knowledge is
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obtained through learning and deduction. Moreover, since axiomatic knowl-
edge is intellectual knowledge, it is not acquired through blind imitation or
instruction. Combining a process of elimination with al-Ghazālī’s claim that
axiomatic knowledge is a natural endowment of the soul, it is not far-fetched
to read al-Ghazālī as making a nativist claim here.
But what about al-Ghazālī’s claim that nobody knows where axiomatic
knowledge comes from, i.e. its proximate cause? Does this rule out a nativist
reading? While this is certainly puzzling, these theses about the origins of
axiomatic knowledge are not mutually exclusive. On the one hand, al-Ghazālī
makes the following cognitive claim:
1. Axiomatic knowledge exists, and it is innate to the mind.
Yet, al-Ghazālī also seems to endorse the following epistemic claim:
2. I do not know the proximate cause of axiomatic knowledge.
Al-Ghazālī can endorse both (1) and (2) without being inconsistent. As we
will see, however, whether (2) represents al-Ghazālī’s considered position will
be a point of interest when we turn back to the Deliverance. As I will argue,
al-Ghazālī discovers that God is, in some sense, the proximate cause of the
existence and our knoweldge of primary truths or axiomatic knowledge.
Let’s us look at another key text:
Know that the sciences that are not axiomatic, but which come
into the heart at certain times, differ in their manner of attain-
ment. Sometimes they come upon the heart as though something
were flung into it from a source it knows not. At other times they
are gained through deduction (istidlāl) and study. That which
is not attained by way of acquisition nor through artful proof
is called general inspiration (ilhām), and that which is attained
through inference is called reflection (i‘tibār) and mental percep-
tion (istibṣār). (RRS XXI: 51)
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Al-Ghazālī once again implies that axiomatic knowledge is innate, by claim-
ing that axiomatic knowledge is not the kind of intellectual knowledge that
enters “into the heart at a certain time”. If all other forms of intellectual
knowledge enter into the heart into a certain time by either being “flung
into the heart” from an unknown source, or acquired through deduction,
study, inspiration, reflection, and perception, then a reasonable reading is
that axiomatic knowledge has always been present in the heart.
There is one more text that fits the nativist story. In the Niche of Lights,
al-Ghazālī writes:
Know that although rational faculties see, the objects that they
see are not with them in the same manner. On the contrary, some
of [the objects] are with them as if they were actually present,
such as self-evident knowledge (ḍarūriyya). For example, the ra-
tional faculty knows that a single thing cannot be both eternal
and created, or both existent and nonexistent; that a single state-
ment cannot be both true and false. (NL: 9-10)
Again, al-Ghazālī claims that self-evident knowledge (unlike other objects of
knowledge) are somehow present in the rational faculty.
There is one text, however, which seems to straightforwardly deny na-
tivism in favor of empiricism. Interestingly, it is from the Deliverance:
Know that man’s essence, in his original condition, is created
in blank simplicity without any information about the “worlds”
of God Most High. These “worlds” are so many that only God
Most High can number them, as He has said: “No one knows the
hosts of your Lord but He”. Man gets his information about the
“worlds” by means of perception. Each one of his kinds of percep-
tion is created in order that man may beget to know thereby a
“world” of the existents—and by “worlds” we mean the categories
of existing things. (DE: 83)
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At first glance, it seems like al-Ghazālī is endorsing empiricism. He seems to
be making a type of tabula rasa claim: man’s essence, in his original condition,
is created in blank simplicity without any information.” Indeed, Treiger reads
al-Ghazālī as an Avicennan and thus denying nativism, in favor of empiricism:
“the second meaning of intelligence refers to knowledge of a priori truths,
acquired by human beings at approximately the age of seven, such as the
knowledge that the whole is greater than any of its parts” (Treiger 2012: 24).
Kukkonen, however, argues that we need to be careful about the epis-
temic and cognitive claims al-Ghazālī is making in this passage. According
to Kukkonen, al-Ghazālī’s is denying that the innate nature of the human be-
ing has any knowledge of particular existents in the world. Axiomatic knowl-
edge is not knowledge of any particular existent, rather it is knowledge that
provides the possibility for knowledge of particular existents:
It is not yet knowledge of anything-it has not arisen out of the
reception of some outside information, the khabar mentioned in
the Deliverer—at the same that it is a condition for the knowl-
edge of anything else. All of this is to say that necessary knowl-
edge provides the matrix of possible relations in which objects of
knowledge are to be set, even as it does not yet constitute actual
knowledge of any real thing. (Kukkonen 2012: 548)
Kukkonen claims—at least implicilty—that axiomatic knowledge is innate for
al-Ghazālī, and that said status does not conflict with the claims in the above
passage because axiomatic knowledge is not about any particular features of
the world.15 Interestingly, in another context Kukkonen ascribes a Platonic
form of nativism to al-Ghazālī:
[I]n good Platonic fashion, Ghazālī believes that everything in
the sensible world—everything that can be cognized and appre-
hended, anyway—is merely a reflection or an after-image of an
15Hadisi (2021: 13) also claims that primary truths are innate for al-Ghazālī, but as we
will see, the status of their innateness does not play a role in his weak fideist reading.
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intelligible archetype. And he believes that knowledge is ulti-
mately about recollection: if knowledge required reaching up to
the heavens or into the bowels of the earth, nobody could ever
retrieve it, which is why our only hope lies in the truth being in
our hearts all the time. (2009: 49)16
If Kukkonen is right that al-Ghazālī ascribes to a Platonic theory of recol-
lection, then it would be true a fortiori that axiomatic knowledge is innate.
However, I will not rely on that claim.
Moreover, while I find Kukkonen’s reading plausible, it is also problem-
atic. As Treiger notes, in some texts al-Ghazālī claims that axiomatic knowl-
edge is acquired in childhood, around the age of seven. Indeed, in the con-
tinuation of the above passage where the seeming tabula rasa claim is made,
al-Ghazālī offers an account of the order in which our perceptual faculties
are created, and thus how we come to know about the categories of existents.
After accounting for the sensory faculties, al-Ghazālī writes:
Then man ascends to another stage, and intellect is created for
him, so that he perceives the necessary, the possible, the impos-
sible, and things not found in the previous stages. (DE: 83)
Similarly, al-Ghazālī writes in Book I of the Revival:
The second [meaning of ‘aql]: It is the science that comes or
types of knowledge that come into being in the disposition of a
child; it discerns the possibility of possible occurrences and the
impossibility of the impossible. It is like the knowledge that two
16For example, al-Ghazālī writes: “We mean that the heart is constantly in a state
of change and being influenced by these secondary causes. The most important of these
influences that come into the heart are involuntary suggestions [khawāṭir]. By involuntary
suggestions I mean the ideas [afkār] and recollections [adkhār] that take place therein. By
these I mean its perceptions of knowledge, either by way of renewal or recollection; for
these are called involuntary suggestions since they come into the mind while the heart has
been unmindful of them.” (RRS XXI: 77-78).
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is more than one, and that one person cannot be in two places
at the same time. This is the definition intended by a certain
theologian when he defined ‘the intellect’ by saying, “It is a facet
of the necessary sciences, like the knowledge of the possibility
of possible occurrences, and the impossibility of the impossible.
(RRS I: 225)
The objection is this: How can al-Ghazālī be a nativist if the disposition to
know primary truths is created in childhood, and is not an original feature
of the mind upon inception? I do not think that these texts sink the case for
reading al-Ghazālī as a nativist.
A few clarifications are in order. First and foremost, I do not regard
al-Ghazālī as a systematic philosopher. That is, he writes his texts with
different purposes and different intentions, depending on the context and the
audience. He is not, at least in essence, concerned with offering a consistent
epistemology. As such, sometimes he may be expressing nativism, whereas
other times he may be expressing empiricism. Second, it is important to note
that, in the Deliverance passage, al-Ghazālī explicitly claims that knowledge
of primary truths is not something that is found in the previous stages of
sensory development. As such, he is implicitly denying the Avicennan view
that primary truths are abstracted from sensory data:
Man is naturally endowed (fuṭira ṭaban) to come into possession
of knowledge and to perceive things by way of the senses and then
by way of estimation (wahm), which is their counterpart. As for
what he perceives by the intellect, it comes about after acquisi-
tion, not naturally ... As for the primary notions (al-awā’il) that
come about in him, they come to pass from induction (istiqrā’)
and testing and proving (tajriba), and from Experience (šahāda)
(The Annotations, 22/95-96, trans. Gutas 2012)
Third, as I formulated nativism above, nativism does not require the claim
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that the content is in the mind or soul upon inception. All nativism claims,
as I have defined the sufficient condition, is that some content is in no way
derived from empirical sources (broadly construed). And al-Ghazālī is still
committed to that. Fourth, there still may be a way to claim that primary
truths actually are present in the soul upon its inception. Al-Ghazālī could
be making a claim about awareness of primary truths, not their cognitive
origins. It is at the age of seven (or some point in childhood), that children
become aware of primary truths. But that is still consistent with the content
being inherent in their minds from infancy. They just could not access the
primary truths in infancy. In short, while I do not think that al-Ghazālī is a
systematic philosopher, there is a way of reading him as consistent on this
score.
Again, my aim here has not been to argue conclusively that al-Ghazālī
is a nativist. Rather, I merely wanted to put a plausible story on the table
that could further motivate reading nativism into al-Ghazālī’s response to
skepticism. Let us now turn to how this view will help us understand al-
Ghazālī’s engagement with skepticism.
4 Nativism and the Divine Light
Let us grant that al-Ghazālī ascribes to nativism about axiomatic knowledge
or primary truths. How should this assumption change our reading of his
resolution to skepticism? Let us start with the now (granted) nativist passage
in question and unpack it:
The aim of this account is to emphasize that one should be most
diligent in seeking the truth until he finally comes to seeking the
unseekable. For primary truths are unseekable, because they are
present in the mind; and when what is present is sought, it is lost
and hides itself. (DE: 58)
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There are two claims here that are noteworthy. The first is an epistemic
claim:
1. Primary truths are unseekable.
The second claim is a cognitive claim:
2. Primary truths are present in the mind.
How should we unpack these two claims? Well, it is clear that (2) is supposed
to be the reason or grounds for (1). Being able to explain this relation would,
then, be a desideratum on an interpretation of the epistemic claim and the
metaphysical claim.
Let us start with the metaphysical claim: given the work done in the
previous section, my suggestion is that (2) just is al-Ghazālī’s committment
to nativism. We can now unpack (1). The unseekability claim in (1) can be
read in one of three ways:
A. Primary truths are not demonstrable.
B. Primary truths do not originate in any empirical (sensory-based) sources.
C. Primary truths do not originate in any rational (intellectually based)
sources.
A is trivially true. For al-Ghazālī, primary truths are supposed to be self-
evident. As such, they are not theorems that require demonstrations. Thus, A
would not be explanatorily useful. However, (2) does explain B and C. Given
nativism, it follows that primary truths do not originate from the senses or
the intellect. As such, in claiming that primary truths are unseekable, al-
Ghazālī is denying that primary truths can be generated by either the senses
or the intellect. This raises, the important question, then of where do primary
truths come from?
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This question is important for two reasons: First, it would be useful to
know how we arrived at the content of primary truths (a cognitive concern).
But second, and more importantly, we must know the origins of primary
truths in order to figure out whether our knowledge of them genuinely counts
as knowledge (an epistemic concern). And it is precisely here where the divine
light that is cast unto al-Ghazālī’s heart becomes relevant.
Recall that in an earlier text from Revival XXI al-Ghazali claimed that
“I do not know the proximate cause of axiomatic knowledge.” My contention
is that this claim does not represent al-Ghazālī’s considered view. Rather, in
the Deliverance al-Ghazālī does discover the cause of primary truths via the
experience of the divine light. And that cause is God.
Allow me to first sketch-out the view of how al-Ghazālī resolves his skep-
tical crisis, and then we can turn to the details and unpack my view and
how it differs from Hadisi’s. On my reading, when al-Ghazālī has an experi-
ence of the divine light, he first and foremost has a mystical experience that
is non-propositional in nature, what we might call a type of knowledge-by-
acquaintance. Al-Ghazālī is having the experience that God is the creator and
source of his innate primary truths. It is this experience, taken as a whole,
that allows al-Ghazālī to secure primary truths, which are the foundations
of knowledge. Primary truths now can meet modal-certainty, because God is
the ultimate source of truth and certainty.
Let us tackle the experience of the divine light. There are two issues
that need to be addressed. First, we must arrive at a more full conception
of this experience and its epistemic status. Second, we must discuss what it
takes to undergo such an experience (I have disagreements with Hadisi on
both of these points). In his epistemological writings, al-Ghazālī makes fine
grained distinctions between different types of epistemic states. Here, I want
to distinguish between three states:
Ascertainment by apodeictic proof leads to knowledge. Intimate
experience of that very state is fruitional experience. Favorable
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acceptance of it based on hearsay and experience of others is
faith. (DE: 82)
The first (and lowest) epistemic state a subject can be in is taqlīd or blind
imitation regarding the truth of some state of affairs. Taqlīd obtains when
a subject believes a proposition by conforming to the beliefs of another sub-
ject, (say) an authority. The next epistemic state a subject can be in is a
state of propositional or discursive knowledge (‘ilm) with respect to some
state of affairs. A subject is in a state of ‘ilm, when their beliefs are based
on apodeictic proof (burhān) (this is the type of knowledge, Ghazalian
Knowledge, that al-Ghazālī is seeking at the outset of the Deliverance).
The highest epistemic state a person can be in is one where they have a
fruititional experience or tasting (dhawq) of some state of affairs. With his
concept of tasting or dhawq, al-Ghazālī commits himself to one variety of
(non-propositional) knowledge-by-acquaintance. In his account of the Sufis
in the Deliverance, al-Ghazālī clarifies the non-propositional knowledge of the
Sufi from the propositional knowledge of (say) the philosopher as follows:
Then it became clear to me that their most distinctive character-
istic is something than can be attained, not by study, but rather
by fruitional experience (al-dhawq) and the state of ecstasy and
the “exchange of qualities.” How great a difference there is be-
tween your knowing the definitions and causes and conditions of
health and satiety and your being healthy and sated! And how
great a difference there is between your knowing the definition
of drunkenness—viz. that it is a term denoting a state resulting
from the predominance of vapors which rise from the stomach to
the centers of thought—and your actualy being drunk! (DE: 78)
Al-Ghazālī is clear that a subject who has dhawq of some state of affairs, q,
is in a better epistemic state than a subject who has ‘ilm of q. A classic ex-
ample: the person who has experienced drunkenness knows that state better
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than the one who doesn’t drink, yet knows physiological and psychological
descriptions of drunkenness. Commentators have claimed that the experience
of the divine light is an instance of dhawq (See, e.g., Gotz 2003). However,
while I agree that the experience of the divine light is a form of knowledge-by-
acquaintance, I do not think that al-Ghazālī has in mind dhawq specifically.
This is because the concept of dhawq, for al-Ghazālī, is specifically used in the
context of describing the types of experiences that Sufi practices can induce.
Indeed, if al-Ghazālī understood the experience of the divine light in terms
of dhawq, then he would have made that explicit. However, he does not use
that term at all in this part of the Deliverance, and it is only introduced in
the context of his pursuit of Sufism in the latter parts of the Deliverance.
And it is here that I have my disagreement with Hadisi.
So, let us ask: what does it take to have this experience of the divine light?
According to Hadisi, a subject must engage in a variety of Sufi transformative
practices that cultivate and discipline her imagination into being receptive to
an experience of the divine light qua dhawq. This is the sense in which Hadisi
ascribes to weak divine interventionism. Yes, God has to rescue al-Ghazālī
from skepticism, but al-Ghazālī must also fulfill a variety of practices in order
for this to happen. Hadisi writes:
Unlike the Cartesian cogito ergo sum which seems to be easily
available to all agents, on Ghazālī’s account, only an expert with
well-trained imagination can access the foundation of all knowl-
edge. (2021: 30)
I agree that al-Ghazālī does claim that Sufi practices are designed to induce
experiences of dhawq. However, these transformative practices are neither
necessary nor sufficient for an experience of the divine light in the context of
engaging skepticism. Indeed, it is problematic to read Sufi practices into al-
Ghazālī’s engagement with skepticism, because at this point in al-Ghazālī’s
intellectual and spiritual autobiography, al-Ghazālī has yet to verify the truth
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of Sufism. It is only after engaging skepticism and other epistemological paths
to the truth, that al-Ghazālī ultimately turns to Sufism as the ultimate path
to the truth, and discovers the realities of dhawq. As such, at this point in his
life, he is supposed to be ignorant of transformative practices that can induce
these specific mystical experiences, and thus has not engaged them. It is for
this reason that al-Ghazālī is best read as a strong divine interventionist in
his response to skepticism. His experience of the divine light is truly due to
the mercy of God, and not due to any of his own activities. Al-Ghazālī is
passive, and arguably must be passive, in order to receive this mercy. On my
reading, the experience of the divine light is not one of dhawq but of kashf
(unveiling), and kashf is ultimately due to the mercy of God. As al-Ghazālī
claims: “whoever thinks that the unveiling of truth depends on precisely
formulated proofs has indeed straitened the broad mercy of God” (DE: 57).
My contention is that the skeptic need not engage any of these practices in
order to have an experience of the divine light that helps rescue them from
skepticism. Nonetheless the experience of the divine light via kashf is akin
to dhawq because it is a type of knowledge-by-acquaintance.
That this experience is one of knowledge-by-acquaintance is key to se-
curing the foundations of knowledge, i.e. primary truths. This is because
al-Ghazālī cannot have ‘ilm of primary truths because ‘ilm requires a proof
(burhān), and primary truths cannot be proven by an argument given (A), for
they are self-evident. As such, al-Ghazālī requires different epistemic grounds
to establish that primary truths do not merely have actual-certainty, but
modal-certainty. My contention is that the experience of the divine light
provides a knoweldge-by-acquaintance that God is the proximate cause of
primary truths. Recall, the three options here:
1. God is the creator of primary truths.
2. God implants primary truths into the mind.
3. It is through the divine light that a subject can recognize the truth and
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certainty of primary truths.
My contention is that it is (3) in particular that al-Ghazālī gets through
his experience of the divine light, and that this is sufficient for escaping
skepticism. Nonetheless, (2) is true as well given al-Ghazālī’s nativism. For
if primary truths are not derived from any empirical sources (broadly con-
strued) then the only source of the existence of primary truths in the mind
has to be God. I will remain agnostic about (1) as I do not want to delve
into the issue of whether al-Ghazālī ascribes to voluntarism in the relevant
sense, i.e. that the truth of primary truths depends on the will of God alone,
as opposed to independent rational standards.
Let us take stock of my analysis by returning to the skeptical challenge
al-Ghazālī faced prior to experiencing the divine light:
1. The only way for S to counter skepticism is through a proof.
2. A proof requires appeal to primary truths.
3. Primary truths are undermined by the dream doubt.
1. S cannot construct a proof to counter skepticism.
∴ S has no way to defeat skepticism.
We can see that under my interpretation, al-Ghazālī can now reject premises
(1) and (3). A proof is not the only way to counter skepticism. A subject can
defeat skepticism through an experience of the divine light via kashf. And
through this experience specifically the subject is able to reject the dream
doubt by re-establishing the foundational status of primary truths.
5 Conclusion
I have argued that al-Ghazālī can be read as a nativist, and that doing
so has interpretive benefits with respect to understanding his resolution of
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skepticism. Ultimately, al-Ghazālī needs an experience of the divine light in
order to secure the foundations of knowledge, namely, primary truths. The
experience of the divine light unveils and transforms the certainty of primary
truths from actual-certainty to modal-certainty. It does so by revealing that
God is the proximate cause of the primary truths that lie inherent in al-
Ghazālī’s mind. This experience is not achieved, however, through any type
of proof or engagement with Sufi practices. Rather, it is wholly due to the
mercy of God.
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